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I have been asked to talk about policy considerations in the use
of nuclear weapons. The United States has been working in a variety
of fora on the issue of military strategy post-Cold War, and the threat
that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction poses. While I
will confine my remarks generally to nuclear weapons, the issue of
post-Cold War military strategy and the threat of weapons of mass
destruction proliferation must be considered in conjunction with the
use of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons.
We are well aware that these weapons have been used. In fact,
the United States' use of nuclear weapons provides some insight into
successful strategy that likely marks the future strategy for military
operations. We first used nuclear weapons to impose a regime of
shock and awe on our enemies that proved sufficient to defeat the
Japanese. Japan offered a unique circumstance because the knowl-
edge of nuclear weapons at that time was not widespread, so their use
came as a huge surprise. Further, Japan had been debilitated over
years of land, sea and air combat against the United States.
Thus, history has shown that nuclear weapons served us well.
Their use defeated the Japanese will to defend their homeland, and
saved literally thousands of both Allied and Japanese lives. Certainly,
our decision to exercise our nuclear capability stopped the more de-
bilitating fire-storm attacks that were wreaked on Japanese cities.1
Many Americans ignore the fact that the policy of the United
States is to use nuclear weapons and to use them first. In my dealings
with other nations, however, I have found that they tend to keep this
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1. See Robert Nathans, Making the Fires That Beat Japan, in FIRE AND THE WAR 136
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element of U.S. policy well in mind, and look upon us a little differ-
ently than we look upon ourselves.
After World War II, the United States used nuclear weapons for
deterrence purposes. I will not elaborate on this point beyond stating
that our policy was founded on the massive deployment of nuclear
weapons.2 During the Cold War, the U.S. military considered various
strategies at different times, including the use of nuclear weapons on
tactical targets.
Although the terms "tactical" and "strategic" are used widely,
they should be avoided whenever possible. Without question, they
are two of the most confusing terms in our modem lexicon, particu-
larly in the military context. Our "tactical nuclear weapons" strategy
meant that we would use nuclear weapons if the Russian army in-
vaded the Fulda gap,3 as this event marked the point at which we
could no longer defend our position with conventional means. We
also contemplated strategic or "demonstration" nuclear weapons-if
U.S. forces were getting overrun and we wanted to encourage the
Russians to desist, we would detonate a nuclear weapon in an iso-
lated area to prevent casualties with the hope that the Russians
would retreat or stop the war.
I used to sit in F-100s on alert with nuclear weapons and I always
found such abstract policy discussions in Washington wholly inane.
These policymakers simply did not understand the very real dangers
inherent in the "tactical" or "strategic" deployment of nuclear weap-
ons. I always wondered whether I would actually take off to fly a
mission with a nuclear weapon-I figured I would, but I was never
sure. The military personnel who sit in the ICBM silos think the
same way. Most human beings will follow their orders, but Generals
may not be prepared to accept the ramifications of giving an order to
launch a nuclear weapon. It is a daunting proposition to have your
finger on the trigger.
As a matter of the balance of world powers and foreign policy,
the Cold War ended the day the Berlin Wall came down. However,
Cold War armies with their nuclear weapons remain in the field.
Consequently, the situation we now face is two-fold. First, how do
we get the nuclear armies off the field of battle? Second, how do we
handle the emerging New World?
2. See, e.g., BRUCE G. BLAIR, STRATEGIC COMMAND AND CONTROL 14-29 (1985).
3. See, e.g., SCOTt SAGAN, EVOLUTION OF U.S. NUCLEAR DOCTRINE 37-43, 53 (1989);
JOHN P. ROSE, EVOLUTION OF US ARMY NUCLEAR DOCTRINE 169-82 (1980); JOHN J.
MEARSHEIMER, CONVENTIONAL DETERRENCE 176-78 (1983).
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In my opinion, the treatment of the emerging New World is the
issue of utmost concern. There are a few nations that possess nuclear
weapons, and have them for purposes unique to themselves. For ex-
ample, while I fear the Russian capacity to destroy our nation, I do
not believe the Russians would use nuclear weapons. Moreover, we
must continue to operate with that hope, and with that attitude to-
ward our Russian counterparts. Further, China's weapons are
probably just as likely to fall on Russian or Japanese soil as they are
to fall on American soil. For this reason, they pose a wide-scale
threat, but that threat extends beyond the Cold War threat. There is
also general concern about the situation with India and Pakistan. If
they exchange nuclear weapons, we are all living downwind, and we
will all suffer because their weapons will be extremely radioactive.4
Finally, we have the case of our ally, Israel. While we may respect
their need to defend themselves, and understand their perception of
being out-numbered and surrounded, Israel's security dilemma
heightens the risk that they might use nuclear weapons. During the
Gulf War, I could not understand why I was receiving so much pres-
sure from the White House to stop the Scud missile attacks on Israel.
That particular pressure was unrelenting and disproportionate com-
pared to all other aspects of the war. While I am not aware of the full
explanation for this, I can speculate that Israel indicated that they
would use nuclear weapons on Baghdad if the Iraqis used chemical
warheads, or if the Iraqis did not stop their attacks.
Many people do not understand that Desert Storm was the first
war against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and of
nuclear weapons in particular. The United States' goals were three-
fold. First, and foremost, was Kuwait's freedom. Second, the indus-
trial West had a selfish interest in maintaining access to oil. Third,
our goal was to cripple Saddam Hussein's nuclear, biological and
chemical weapons program, and in this pursuit we found the Iraqis
far more advanced than anyone had speculated prior to the war.
It is alleged that the United States' possession of nuclear weap-
ons precluded the Iraqi use of chemical weapons against our forces in
the field. Several public announcements during the Gulf War im-
plied that an Iraqi chemical weapons attack would be met with a nu-
clear response. While in Jordan, before going home to bury them-
4. The nuclear weapons produced by countries (like India and Pakistan) that do not have
sophisticated nuclear facilities are more primitive in design than are U.S. weapons, and are
therefore likely to create larger bursts of radiation. More advanced designs are often "clean"
weapons which produce lower levels of radiation.
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selves, Saddam Hussein's two sons-in-law revealed that "It was [the
United States'] nuclear threat that kept us from using our chemical
weapons."5
However, these men were not in the inner circle. Captured Iraqi
generals told us a vastly different story. According to them, Iraq
could have used chemical weapons, but chose not to. Iraq knew that
U.S. forces were much better protected, our chem-gear, our proce-
dures and our preparedness against the use of chemical weapons
would cause more Iraqi than American casualties. While I agree
American troops were better protected, I doubt that Iraqi generals
had permission to use chemical weapons.
Deterrence use of nuclear weapons in the post-Cold War world
would be flawed. There is in deterrence theory the problem of the
irrational actor. The rational actor will realize that modem delivery
vehicles have the capability to detonate nuclear weapons, bombs, or
warheads wherever desired, in an attempt to deter. The irrational ac-
tor, however, is going to question our will despite any potential con-
sequences. For example, Saddam Hussein's strategy was not to de-
feat us in battle, but to inflict sufficient casualties, so that people
would take to the streets in Washington, New York, Rome, Paris and
London, as they did to oppose the Vietnam War. The irrational actor
either does not care if we use nuclear weapons, or is insane enough to
desire their use.
Although the main actors in the world are not irrational, rational
actors may nonetheless look upon the United States' potential use of
nuclear weapons as untenable. History supports this perception. For
example, our targeting strategy in Desert Storm made massive efforts
to avoid collateral damage. The coalition did everything possible to
avoid loss of life, even in the Iraqi forces. We went after their tanks
and ammunitions, which proved to be a highly successful strategy de-
signed to cause their troops to surrender. Based on this pattern, the
rational actor will have to conclude that it will be very difficult for
any American president to use nuclear weapons. Therefore, the ra-
tional actor will not be deterred by our threats to use nuclear weap-
ons.
5. Going Home to Death: Murder in the Hussein Family, WoRLD PRESS REV., May 1,
1996, available in 1996 WL 8399623; see also Hijack of Flight 150: The Highjackers, DAILY
TELEGRAPH LONDON, Aug. 28,1996, available in 1996 WL 3975539.
6. The coalition of countries assembled by the United States through the United Nations
to prosecute Operation Desert Storm. Key coalition allies included Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria,
the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Turkey and Canada.
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With the end of the Cold War, we must strive to develop the
right answer on nuclear weapons. The United States needs a vision
of where we want the world to be. While it may not be possible or
achievable, a vision of a world free of nuclear weapons is worthy of
pursuit. By signing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the United
States adopted this vision.7 Even if we could achieve the destruction
of the existing stock of nuclear weapons, the world will not be dan-
ger-free because the potential to build nuclear weapons continues to
exist. One answer is that we must maintain the ability to research
nuclear weapons technologies to recover quickly a nuclear deterrent
capability should the need arise.
A three-phase approach should be taken in this New World
where threats are proliferating far faster than anyone can imagine.
First, we need protection. We must be able to withstand a nuclear
weapons attack. Protection would begin with programs such as Bal-
listic Missile Defense, both for ourselves and other nations seeking
protection from the United States. However, these other nations
may not necessarily be our friends, as the following anecdote demon-
strates.
General Ivanoff, the head of the Russian military space program,
came to visit me. As we went through all the space facilities, he
spoke to some of the young men. We sat down for a meeting, and the
sixteen-year-old kid that lives inside me could not resist the tempta-
tion to stick a needle in the Russian. I said, "General, you know, the
United States of America, whether you like it or not, is going to de-
velop ballistic missile defenses because North Korea's going to get a
three-thousand mile missile and it's just going to be politically unten-
able for our government to allow our people to be attacked from
space. And you also know that if we get a ballistic missile defense it
will have the capability to shoot any one of your satellites and I sup-
pose you don't like that at all. So have you even considered joining
with us in anti-ballistic missile defenses?"
I then received a fifteen-minute tirade against ballistic missile
defenses. I replied, "You know, it's kind of stupid on your part to
take that attitude because you and I are not going to go to war
against each other. We are not going to destroy each other's coun-
tries. We don't have to like each other, we don't have to get along,
but we need to learn how to work together because you have the
7. See Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, opened for signature July 1,
1968,21 U.S.T. 483,729 U.N.T.S. 161.
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problem right now, not me. You have North Korea, China, India,
Pakistan, Iraq, Iran, Syria, all on your border, not on my border, and
you don't have the capability to defend yourselves, and you need it
far more than I do. And we have the technology to put up objects in
space, whether lasers or silver bullets, to disable ballistic missiles over
the entire earth with a great degree of certainty. You, by the way,
have the ability to launch them. You have massive launch capabili-
ties we could use. So, why don't we do this together."
Ivanoff became very quiet. I could tell his generals were all
shaking. I was drinking a cup of coffee, and I was feeling content be-
cause I had stuck a needle in a Russian. He remained quiet, and then
turned to me and said, "Who is against this?"
I replied, "Well, first of all we've got Cold Warriors in Washing-
ton and in Moscow who want to maintain the status quo. They made
their reputation on fighting the Cold War and they want keep it alive.
Second of all, in my country we have to go to the Congress for money
and that is very difficult for us to do."
He thought some more. We then returned to the normal brief-
ing routine. As we said good-bye, he pulled me aside by the airplane.
He turned to me and said, "I hope you have good luck with your
Congress."
The point of this story is that cooperation is possible if we con-
front those concerned rather than maneuver around each other as if
in a chess game.
Beyond protecting our nation, we must protect our forces so
they can withstand nuclear attack. As a nation we must have the
courage to understand that we may well be the target of a nuclear at-
tack. Everyone talks about the bomb in the hull of a ship in New
York City.8 While that may happen, first and foremost the govern-
ment must seek to establish the means to protect the citizens of the
United States from nuclear attacks of all types, including those deliv-
ered by terrorists or ballistic missiles.
Second, in addition to protection, measures to control the spread
of nuclear weapons are fundamentally important. While I have little
faith that arms control will solve the problem without strong arms, I
believe that if we have strong arms, then arms control has merit.
When I think of U.S. policy, I envision patting our enemies on the
head while looking for a club. The following provides a less extreme
8. See generally Dipankar De Sarkar, Disarmament: Specter of Nuclear Terrorism Wor-
ries Physicians, Inter Press Service, Dec. 3, 1996, available in 1996 WL 14476643.
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illustration. I once stayed with a very liberal U.S. Ambassador in
Bahrain. I asked him, "How come you're so nice to me? You don't
like the military." He replied, "Without the military there is no di-
plomacy." As evidenced by his answer, I believe that the diplomatic
effort in arms control is the next element we need to pursue.
Third, and perhaps most difficult, is the need for a substantial,
credible, and capable conventional military force. I do not believe in
any deterrent effect of nuclear weapons because nuclear weapons are
best used against cities where civilian casualties would be high. On
the other hand, three B-2s armed with laser-guided munitions will de-
stroy half the vehicles of an attacking armored division with one pass.
A B-2, which is virtually unstoppable, can travel anywhere in the
world, and can carry four thousand pounds of guided munitions.
Imagine the effect of the following threat on a foreign Capital; "I'm
going to take out every one of your governmental buildings, institu-
tions, and sites of national security, and do it simultaneously with one
airplane"? Such a threat represents true deterrence. Unfortunately,
it is very expensive to maintain such a force. Consequently, there are
those who favor nuclear deterrence theory over conventional deter-
rence theory due to cost considerations. Given the inherent prob-
lems with nuclear deterrence theory previously discussed, we must
keep our conventional defenses powerful.
This topic, vital to our future, must be debated. Some are hesi-
tant to embrace these new ideas, because they are comforted by the
past and have little faith in the future. It is crucial to the world that
we open the books, that we improve the dialogue, and that we search
for ways to rid ourselves of the specter of nuclear weapons, particu-
larly at today's levels.
1997]

